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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Eric Scott Spokas appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for 
appointment of post-conviction counsel. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Spokas was charged with attempted strangulation.  (#43933 R., pp. 24-25.)  He 
pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of aggravated assault via an Alford plea (#43933 R., p. 
49, 51-52; #43933 Tr., p. 6, L. 23 – p. 7, L. 5; p. 17, L. 18 – p. 18, L. 17), was sentenced 
to four years imprisonment with two years fixed, and was placed on probation (#43933 
R., p. 86).  Spokas appealed his sentence and judgment of conviction, which the Idaho 
Court of Appeals later affirmed in an unpublished opinion.  State v. Spokas, 2016 
Unpublished Opinion No. 625 (Idaho App., Aug. 1, 2016). 
 Spokas filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.  (See R., pp. 4-8.)  There were no affidavits or supporting documents 
accompanying the petition.  (See generally, R.)  Spokas also filed a Motion To Proceed In 
Forma Pauperis And Supporting Affidavit (R., pp. 9-12), a Motion For Appointment Of 
Counsel (R., pp. 13-14), and an Affidavit In Support Of Motion For Appointment Of 
Counsel (R., pp. 15-16). 
 The district court issued a notice of intent to dismiss Spokas’s petition.  (R., pp. 
18-26.)  In the notice the court found that Spokas could not show ineffective assistance 
based on counsel’s alleged failure to investigate or prepare for trial, because Spokas 
pleaded guilty and did not go to trial—as a result, “there was no right to relief.”  (R., p. 
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23.)  Moreover, the court found that “Spokas never filed any affidavits creating a factual 
issue regarding his claim that his counsel failed to address or argue facts and witness 
statements,” and that the court was “not required to accept mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or a petitioner’s conclusions of law.”  (R., p. 24.)  
The district court accordingly indicated its intent to dismiss Spokas’s petition, and 
contemporaneously “denied Spokas’ motions for appointment of counsel and to proceed 
in forma pauperis.”  (R., pp. 19, 24-25.)   
 Spokas filed a response to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss.  (R., pp. 
27-30.)  The response was unverified, unsigned, and not supported by any affidavits or 
other evidence.  (See generally, R., pp. 27-30.)  In it, Spokas addressed the court’s denial 
of his motions to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel.  Spokas 
claimed that “[post-conviction] counsel is required to present a meaningful claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel” due to the complexity of the issues involved; that the 
Sixth Amendment “guarantees effective assistance of counsel at all stages of criminal 
proceedings regardless of indigent status”; and that a “dismissal on these grounds 
constitutes a violation of the Petitioner[’]s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment 
and the right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and would tend to indicate 
prejudice against poor or needy people by the State of Idaho.”  (R., pp. 27-28.) 
 The district court issued an order summarily dismissing the petition.  (R., pp. 31-
37.)  The court maintained its original rationales for dismissal—failure to state a right to 
relief and lack of evidence—but also made note of why Spokas’s Response to the notice 
was unavailing: “Spokas’s Response is not signed or verified and adds no factual issue 
regarding his claim.”  (R., p. 36.) 
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 Spokas timely appealed from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his 






Spokas states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Spokas’ 
motion for appointment of counsel? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Spokas failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 




Spokas Fails To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Motion 
To Appoint Counsel 
 
A. Introduction 
 Spokas argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion 
for the appointment of counsel.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.)  He claims the court erred by 
applying an incorrect standard, and failed to look to whether Spokas “alleged facts 
showing the possibility of a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim that a reasonable 
person with adequate means would retain counsel to further investigate.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 5.) 
 This argument fails because the district court determined Spokas failed to show he 
had a right to relief and failed to support his claims with evidence.  (R., pp. 35-37.)  By 
definition this was a failure to show any possibility of a valid ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.  Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Spokas’s 
petition and denying his motion for the appointment of counsel. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Summary dismissal is appropriate where the petitioner’s evidence raises no 
genuine issue of material fact.  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 
(2007).  On review of a summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, “this Court will 
determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and 
admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”  Id. at 523, 164 P.3d at 803.   
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“A decision to grant or deny a request for counsel in post-conviction cases is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”  Shackelford v. State, 160 Idaho 317, 325, 372 P.3d 
372, 380 (2016) (citing Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 393, 327 P.3d 365, 369 (2014)). 
 
C. The District Court Properly Denied Spokas’s Motions For Appointment Of 
Counsel, As Spokas Failed To Show Any Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
 
Post-conviction motions for appointment of counsel are “governed by I.C. § 19–
4904, which provides that in proceedings under the UPCPA, a court-appointed attorney 
‘may be made available’ to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of representation.” 
Shackelford, 160 Idaho at 325, 327 P.3d at 380 (quoting I.C. § 19–4904). “The standard 
for determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner in a post-conviction 
proceeding is whether the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim.”  
Id. (citing Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393, 327 P.3d at 369). 
To show a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
satisfy a two-prong test and show both that 1) “counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness,” and 2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–95 (1984).  A reviewing court’s 
“scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential”; therefore, “a court must 
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance.”  Id. at 689. 
Petitioners that plead guilty, and who therefore do not proceed to trial, do not have 
a “right to relief” where the claimed ineffectiveness stems from alleged failures to prepare 
for trial: 
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Bjorklund also claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to bring a 
motion to change venue and for failing to fully investigate the underlying 
criminal charges. The district court found that there was no right to relief 
related to these allegations because Bjorklund pled guilty to the crime. 
Even if true, these matters could have only affected the representation of 
Bjorklund had the matter gone to trial, which it did not. Hence, there was 
no right to relief. 
 
Bjorklund v. State, 130 Idaho 373, 377, 941 P.2d 345, 349 (Ct. App. 1997). 
“In determining whether the appointment of counsel would be appropriate, every 
inference must run in the petitioner’s favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that 
time and cannot be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts.” 
Shackelford, 160 Idaho at 325, 372 P.3d at 380 (quoting Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 
342, 223 P.3d 281, 284 (2009) (quotation marks omitted)).  Nevertheless, courts are not 
“required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by 
admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.”  State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 
898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
Here, the district court correctly determined that Spokas had no right to relief and 
failed to support his claims with admissible evidence.  (R., pp. 36-37.)  As such the 
district court correctly dismissed his petition, and denied his motion for appointment of 
counsel.  Spokas’s claims appear primarily to relate to errors in trial preparation or 
presentation: 
There exists evidence of material facts and witness statements which were 
omitted or not given due consideration. Defense counsel failed to [address] 
or argue such, which would have been exculpatory or mitigating and 
should be considered ineffective. 
… 
[Counsel] failed to [address] video evidence, physical evidence medical 
evidence or lack thereof. Failed to address evidence of alleged victim[’]s 
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habits and routine practices, [character] and substance abuse, statements of 
character and existing physiological condition of alleged victim, namely 
brain tumors. 
 
(R., pp. 5-6 (capitalization altered).) 
 These allegations fail to establish even a possibility of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, such that counsel should have been appointed.  First, per 
Bjorklund, defendants who plead guilty cannot show a right to relief for counsel’s faulty 
trial preparation.  Bjorklund, 130 Idaho at 377, 941 P.2d at 349.  This is precisely what 
Spokas appears to be claiming here; claims that evidence was ignored, undiscovered, or 
otherwise mismanaged are claims relating to the presentation of a case at trial.  Because 
Spokas pleaded guilty he never went to trial, and like Bjorklund, he had no right to relief 
to claim ineffective assistance of counsel based on evidentiary, trial-level errors. 
 Second, even if Spokas had viable claims, he failed to support them with any facts 
or evidence.  Spokas repeatedly claimed there were bodies of evidence supporting his 
claims—but never stated what the evidence was.  Beyond broad references to unspecified 
“material facts,” “witness statements,” “exculpatory” evidence, “video evidence,” 
“physical evidence,” and “medical evidence,” Spokas’s verified petition alleges only one 
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fact: that his victim has, or at some point had, brain tumors.1  (R., p. 6.)  This unadorned 
fact falls far short of establishing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Because 
even if the allegation were true, Spokas did not explain below, and does not attempt to 
explain on appeal, how the purported existence of brain tumors affected the case or 
affected his counsel’s performance below.  (See generally, R.; see generally, Appellant’s 
brief.) 
 To sum up, Spokas alleged a host of trial-preparation claims to which he had no 
right to relief, and for which he provided no supporting evidence.  For the single fact he 
alleged, he failed to explain how it was relevant at all, much less did he connect it to a 
valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Because Spokas’s petition failed to show 
even a possibility of a valid claim, the district court correctly denied his motion for the 
appointment of counsel. 
                                            
1 Spokas filed a “Petitioner[’]s Response to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief” which alleged additional facts—but which was not signed, not 
verified, and was not supported by any affidavits or any other evidence.  (See R., pp. 27-
30.)  Post-conviction petitions for relief must be verified and must contain either 
“[a]ffidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations,” or a statement 
explaining the lack of evidence.  I.C. § 19-4903; Pentico v. State, 159 Idaho 350, 354, 
360 P.3d 359, 363 (Ct. App. 2015).  Applying that standard here, the district court noted 
that “Spokas’ Reponse is not signed or verified,” and as such it “adds no factual issue 
regarding his claim.”  (R., p. 36.)  Spokas has not challenged this finding on appeal.  (See 
generally, Appellant’s brief.)  Nevertheless, to the extent Spokas appears to rely on the 
unverified facts found in the Response (see, e.g. Appellant’s brief, p. 6) the state contends 
these alleged facts are contradicted by the record (such as alleged facts showing that 
Spokas “was at work or otherwise not present at the time of the alleged crime,” despite 
his on-the-record guilty plea admissions of being present), inadmissible (such as hearsay 
statements regarding the victim’s alleged character or medical conditions), speculative 
(such as statements that trial counsel was “pre-occupied with other matters relating to an 
impending change in employment”), and in any event, given Spokas’s guilty plea, still 
fail to show even a possibility of a valid claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.  (See 
R., pp. 28-29.) 
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Spokas argues on appeal that the district court erred by not “discuss[ing] the 
merits of Mr. Spokas’ motion for appointment of counsel separately from the merits of 
his ineffective assistance” claim; he avers this was an error because the “‘decision to 
appoint counsel and the decision on the merits of the petition if counsel is appointed are 
controlled by two different standards.’”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5 (quoting Swader v. 
State, 143 Idaho 651, 655 (2007)).) 
 However, Spokas fails to show that the district court applied the wrong standard 
insofar as his claims would not have been sufficient to satisfy either standard.  The 
district court found that Spokas had failed to state a valid claim and “failed to file any 
affidavits creating a factual issue regarding his claim.”  (R., p. 37.)  In other words, 
Spokas’s claims were devoid of both legal and factual support.  This not only justified the 
dismissal of the petition, but it constituted a failure to show even the possibility of a valid 
claim—therefore justifying the denial of his motion to appoint counsel.  Because 
Spokas’s claims fail under either test, he fails to show the district court applied the 
incorrect one when it denied his motion to appoint counsel. 
 Lastly, Spokas apparently attempts to distinguish this case from Bjorklund by 
taking issue with the court’s findings regarding his guilty plea: 
The district court stated it intended to summarily dismiss Mr. Spokas’ 
petition because he “fails to identify how the result would have changed” 
because he “clearly admitted his guilt in a guilty plea.” (R., p. 23.) This is 
not correct. Mr. Spokas did not admit his guilt at any point. On the 
contrary, he pled guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, and has 
always maintained that he did not commit the crime of aggravated battery. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6 (emphasis in original).) 
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But Spokas fails to show what difference it would make that his guilty plea was an 
Alford plea.  A guilty plea means the defendant does not go to trial.  This is true 
regardless of whether it is a routine guilty plea, or an Alford guilty plea.2  The rule from 
Bjorklund would therefore apply whether or not the plea is an Alford plea.  See 
Bjorklund, 130 Idaho at 377, 941 P.2d at 349.   
This was precisely the analysis the district court performed here:  the district court 
noted that Spokas pleaded guilty, did not go to trial, and therefore failed “to identify how 
the result would have changed.”  (R., p. 36.)  To put it in Bjorklund’s terms, because 
Spokas pleaded guilty and did not go to trial, he had no right to relief for the trial-level 
investigatory errors alleged in his petition.  Bjorklund, 130 Idaho at 377, 941 P.2d at 349.  
The fact that Spokas pleaded guilty via Alford, while perhaps worth noting for semantic 
posterity, has no bearing on the court’s correct application of Bjorklund. 
 Spokas failed to allege any right to relief and failed to support his claims with 
sufficient evidence.  As a result he failed to show even a possibility of a valid claim, and 
the district court correctly denied his motion for the appointment of counsel. 
 
                                            
2 Idaho courts, for decades, have concluded that per North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 
25 (1970), a court may accept a defendant’s guilty plea notwithstanding the defendant’s 
claims of innocence. (See, e.g., State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 547–48, 661 P.2d 328, 
332–33 (1983) (“This Court found that ‘the defendant’s denial of criminal intent does not 
affect the validity of his guilty plea,’ and held that under North Carolina v. Alford, a 
voluntary plea of guilty may be accepted by a court ‘despite denial of any criminal 





 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s denial of 
Spokas’s motion for appointment of counsel and dismissal of his petition. 
 DATED this 26th day of October, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans____________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
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 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of October, 2017, served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic 
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 ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




 _/s/ Kale D. Gans_____________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
 Deputy Attorney General 
KDG/dd 
 
 
